Structure of global buyer-supplier networks and its implications for conflict minerals regulations by unknown
Mizuno et al. EPJ Data Science  (2016) 5:2 
DOI 10.1140/epjds/s13688-016-0063-7
REGULAR ART ICLE Open Access
Structure of global buyer-supplier
networks and its implications for conﬂict
minerals regulations
Takayuki Mizuno1,2,3,4*, Takaaki Ohnishi4,5 and Tsutomu Watanabe4,6
*Correspondence: mizuno@nii.ac.jp




SOKENDAI (The Graduate University
for Advanced Studies), Hitotsubashi,
Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo, 101-8430, Japan
Full list of author information is
available at the end of the article
Abstract
We investigate the structure of global inter-ﬁrm linkages using a dataset that contains
information on business partners for about 400,000 ﬁrms worldwide, including all the
ﬁrms listed on the major stock exchanges. Among the ﬁrms, we examine three
networks, which are based on customer-supplier, licensee-licensor, and strategic
alliance relationships. First, we show that these networks all have scale-free topology
and that the degree distribution for each follows a power law with an exponent of 1.5.
The shortest path length is around six for all three networks. Second, we show
through community structure analysis that the ﬁrms comprise a community with
those ﬁrms that belong to the same industry but diﬀerent home countries, indicating
the globalization of ﬁrms’ production activities. Finally, we discuss what such
production globalization implies for the proliferation of conﬂict minerals (i.e., minerals
extracted from conﬂict zones and sold to ﬁrms in other countries to perpetuate
ﬁghting) through global buyer-supplier linkages. We show that a limited number of
ﬁrms belonging to some speciﬁc industries and countries plays an important role in
the global proliferation of conﬂict minerals. Our numerical simulation shows that
regulations on the purchases of conﬂict minerals by those ﬁrms would substantially
reduce their worldwide use.
Keywords: global supply chain; inter-ﬁrm network; conﬂict minerals; scale-free;
community detection
1 Introduction
Many complex physical systems can be modeled and better understood as complex net-
works [–]. Recent studies show that economic systems can also be regarded as complex
networks in which economic agents, like consumers, ﬁrms, and governments, are closely
connected [, ]. To understand the interaction among economic agents, wemust uncover
the structure of economic networks.
Our focus in this paper is on inter-ﬁrm networks. Over the last several years, a pair of
critical incidences revealed the global interconnection of ﬁrms: the ﬁnancial turmoil trig-
gered by the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States and the disruption of world-
wide supply chains caused by the  Fukushima earthquake and tsunami in Japan. These
incidences sparked interest in inter-ﬁrm networks by network scientists, economists, and
sociologists. Several aspects of inter-ﬁrm relationships were previously studied, includ-
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ing the ﬁrm and bank relationship [], the customer-supplier relationship [–], and the
ownership relationship (i.e., which ﬁrm owns which ﬁrm) [, ]. The degree distribution
follows a power law, and the shortest path-lengths for any pair of ﬁrms are around ﬁve [,
, ]. Newman’s community analysis [, ] also shows that ﬁrms tend to transact with
each other when they belong to the same industry and/or are located in the same state
or prefecture []. The structure of the inter-ﬁrm networks investigated was found to be
stable [].
One limitation of previous studies is that they mainly addressed inter-ﬁrm relationships
within a country, so they have little to say about the linkages of ﬁrms in diﬀerent countries.
Important exceptions include studies on global ownership structure [], and global R&D
partnerships []. However, no work has yet investigated the structure of global customer-
supplier linkages, which is the key to understanding the nature of the above incidences
(i.e., the global ﬁnancial crisis and the disruption of global supply chains by natural disas-
ters). Given this background, we investigate the global aspect of inter-ﬁrm linkages using a
unique dataset that contains information on business relationships (both domestic and in-
ternational) for about , ﬁrmsworldwide. This is the ﬁrst contribution of this paper.
Note that if one aggregates transactions (purchases and sales) at the ﬁrm level, one obtains
transactions at the country level, called international trade by economists. The network
structure of international trade has recently been studied by economists and physicists
[–]. Our investigation of international transactions at the ﬁrm level is closely related
to those studies, but our ﬁrm level data reveal that ﬁrms are more likely to transact with
other ﬁrms in the same industry rather than other ﬁrms in the same home country, which
is quite diﬀerent from what is assumed in studies on international trade. We will expand
this point below.
After examining the structure of global inter-ﬁrm networks, we discuss the implications
of global linkages at the ﬁrm level for the proliferation of ‘conﬂict minerals’ through global
buyer-supplier linkages. This is the second contribution of this paper. Conﬂict minerals
are natural minerals (gold, tin, tungsten, etc.) that are extracted from conﬂict zones and
sold to perpetuate ﬁghting. Themost prominent example is the natural minerals extracted
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) by armed groups and funneled through
a variety of intermediaries before being purchased by multinational electronics ﬁrms in
industrial countries. There is wide discussion on how to mitigate the worldwide spread
of conﬂict minerals [–]. For example, the U.S. government passed a law in July 
that requires listed ﬁrms to audit their supply chains and report the use in their products
of conﬂict minerals from the DRC or adjoining countries []. In this paper, we conduct
simulation analysis using our ﬁrm level data on global buyer-supplier linkages to evaluate
the eﬀectiveness of various measures to mitigate the worldwide propagation of conﬂict
minerals through global supply chains.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section  provides a detailed description of
our dataset, and Section  looks at the basic features of inter-ﬁrm networks, including de-
gree distributions. Section  examines how closely ﬁrms are interconnected bymeasuring
the shortest path lengths between them. Section  conducts community analysis employ-
ing a network’s modularity deﬁned by Newman. Section  conducts simulation analysis to
investigate the proliferation of conﬂict minerals through global supply chains. Section 
concludes the paper.
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2 Dataset
For this research, we used a unique dataset compiled by S&P Capital IQ, which is part
of McGraw Hill Financial Inc. []. The dataset covers , major incorporated ﬁrms
with information of business relationships in  countries in  industry sectors that
were deﬁned by the S&P, including all the listed ﬁrms in the world. Attribute information
is available for those ﬁrms, including the location of a ﬁrm, the industry a ﬁrm belongs to,
and other information reported in the ﬁnancial statement of a ﬁrm. The dataset has lists
of core partners (i.e., customers, suppliers, licensors, licensees, and strategic alliances) in
recent period (i.e.,  and/or ) and in some years over the entire sample period
(almost all relationships date from ) for a ﬁrmwith IDs. For example, the numbers of
core customers and suppliers for IBM are  and  ﬁrms in the recent period and ,
and  ﬁrms in some years over the entire sample period. The following relationship
exists between customers and suppliers. When ﬁrm j is a supplier to ﬁrm i, ﬁrm i is a
customer of ﬁrm j. Licensees and licensors have such an opposite relationship.
Before moving to detailed analysis using this dataset, let us make some remarks about
statistical characteristics of the dataset. Needless to say, it is important to have a dataset
with high quality and completeness about networks, but, in reality, it is very hard to have
such an ideal dataset. It is especially so if themain interest of researchers is on global inter-
ﬁrm networks rather than local ones. Given this, we do not claim that the dataset we em-
ploy in this paper is a perfect one. However, we are still able to evaluate how (in)complete
the dataset is by comparing this dataset with other datasets on interﬁrm linkages. For
linkages among Japanese ﬁrms, we have access to the dataset compiled by Tokyo Shoko
Research, Ltd. [], which was used by many researchers. This dataset is said to contain
almost complete information on linkages among Japanese ﬁrms. According to this dataset,
the average number of customer links for a ﬁrm in  is ., while the corresponding
number for supplier linkage is .. On the other hand, according to the Capital IQ dataset,
the average number of customer and supplier links for a ﬁrm is . and ., respectively.
This comparison indicates that the Capital IQ dataset covers about  percent, suggesting
that the Capital IQ dataset is far from a complete one. However, if we restrict our attention
to listed ﬁrms in Japan, the average number of customer and supplier links for a ﬁrm are
. and . in the Tokyo Shoko Research dataset, while they are . and . in the Capital
IQ dataset, indicating that the coverage is higher at about  percent. This implies that the
Capital IQ dataset contains more information on links among major ﬁrms than on other
links.
3 Scale-free global inter-ﬁrm networks
Weﬁrst show the common scale-free properties of three global inter-ﬁrmnetworks, which
are based on customer-supplier, licensee-licensor, and strategic alliance relationships. We
investigate the cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) of links across ﬁrms for the fol-
lowing linkages: customer, supplier, licensee, licensor, and strategic alliance. In Figure ,
the horizontal axis is the number of links, and the vertical axis represents the cumulative
densities. The CDFs of each kind of linkage have tails that follow a power law function.
To test whether each link distribution has a power law tail, we conduct a likelihood ratio
test, in which a power law distribution is a null hypothesis and log normal distribution
is an alternative hypothesis. This test is known to be a uniformly most powerful unbi-
ased test [–]. Table  shows the estimated power law ranges for link distributions.
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Figure 1 CDFs of links across ﬁrms for customer linkages (left, black), supplier linkages (left red),
licensee linkages (center, black), licensor linkages (center, red), and strategic alliance linkages (right).
Dashed lines show distribution in recent period (i.e., 2013 and/or 2014). Solid lines show distribution in some
years over entire sample period. Guidelines express power law with an exponent of 1.5.
Table 1 Likelihood-ratio tests of link distributions. The null hypothesis is that, beyond some
threshold, the upper tail of a link distribution is characterized by a power law distribution.
The alternative hypothesis is that the upper tail follows a lognormal beyond the same
threshold. The signiﬁcance level is set at 5 percent. The power law exponent associated with
each link distribution is estimated using observations belonging to the corresponding power
law range
Power law exponent Standard error Power law range
Recent period (2013, 2014)
Supplier linkage –1.37 0.018 2≤ Ns ≤ 89
Customer linkage –1.20 0.028 2 ≤ Nc ≤ 79
Licensee linkage –1.58 0.027 2 ≤ Nle ≤ 30
Licensor linkage –1.60 0.030 2≤ Nlo ≤ 24
Strategic alliance linkage –1.29 0.032 2 ≤ Nsa ≤ 23
Entire sample period
Supplier linkage –1.43 0.017 2≤ Ns ≤ 420
Customer linkage –1.52 0.042 2 ≤ Nc ≤ 516
Licensee linkage –1.31 0.021 2 ≤ Nle ≤ 30
Licensor linkage –1.55 0.032 2≤ Nlo ≤ 40
Strategic alliance linkage –1.30 0.030 2 ≤ Nsa ≤ 47
For example, for supplier linkage, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for ≤ Ns ≤ .
Overall, the results in Table  indicates that the null hypothesis cannot be rejected for all
types of linkage and that the power law exponent associated with each link distribution,
which is estimated using observations belonging to the corresponding power law range,
is somewhere around .. Networks with such power laws are called scale-free networks.
It should be noted that, in Ref. [], we deﬁne the number of links for a ﬁrm as the total
number of links the ﬁrm had over multiple years. This deﬁnition might have contributed
to making the tail part of the observed distribution appear heavier than it really is. To
explain why, suppose that there are some ﬁrms with a large number of links and that these
ﬁrms change their partners much more frequently than other ﬁrms. In this case, the total
number of their partners over multiple years for these ﬁrms is very large, so that we may
observe a power law tail even if the true link distribution at a particular point in time does
not have such a heavy tail. Put diﬀerently, a power law tail emerges reﬂecting heterogeneity
across ﬁrms in terms of link turnover. To cope with this, we repeat the same power law test
but now using observations only for a shorter period (i.e., -). Table  shows that
the results are not so sensitive to changes in the length of the sample period examined.
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4 Six degrees of separation betweenmajor incorporated ﬁrms
Wemeasure the shortest path lengths (SPLs) for each pair of ﬁrms i and j in a non-directed
customer-supplier network over the entire sample period. The number of ﬁrms on it is
,, so there are about  billion pairs. Although the density for the linkages in this
network is very low, only .× –, the number of ﬁrms in its maximum connected com-
ponent is ,, which is about .% of all the ﬁrms. Figure  shows the SPL distri-
bution for the connected pairs. The mode of distribution is ﬁve path lengths, and about
% of the pairs are connected by six path lengths or fewer. We also investigate the mode
for the directed customer-supplier network to consider intermediate products or money
ﬂow. This mode is also short, only seven path lengths. We also measure the SPLs in non-
directed licensee-licensor, directed licensee-licensor, and non-directed strategic alliance
networks. The number of ﬁrms, the network density for the linkages, the size of the max-
imum connected component, and the mode of the SPLs are shown in Table . The mode
in these networks is also short: around six path lengths.
The SPL distribution of a domestic non-directed customer-supplier network was previ-
ously reported [, , ]. In the Japanese case, the mode of SPL distribution is ﬁve path
lengths. International linkages for ﬁrms were not taken in these previous studies; the ac-
tual SPL for the Japanese ﬁrm’s pairs is shorter than ﬁve path lengths. We compare SPLs
Figure 2 Distributions of shortest path lengths (SPLs) for ﬁrm pairs. Left and right ﬁgures show
distributions in recent period (i.e., 2013 and/or 2014) and in some years over entire sample period. Circles,
squares, open triangles, open circles, and open squares express distributions in non-directed
customer-supplier, non-directed licensee-licensor, non-directed strategic alliance, directed customer-supplier,
and directed licensee-licensor networks, respectively.
Table 2 Number of ﬁrms, network density for linkages, maximum connected component
(MCC) size, andmode of shortest path lengths in customer-supplier (CS), licensee-licensor
(LL), and strategic alliance (SA) networks in recent period (i.e., 2013 and/or 2014) and over
entire sample period
# of ﬁrms Density % of MCC Mode
Non-directed Directed Non-directed Directed
CS net.a 345, 909 1.1× 10–5 5.7× 10–6 92.0% 5 7
CS net.b 123, 052 2.5× 10–5 1.3× 10–5 85.4% 6 8
LL net.a 36, 264 6.5× 10–5 3.6× 10–5 60.4% 6 8
LL net.b 12, 646 1.6× 10–4 8.5× 10–5 54.3% 8 8
SA net.a 124, 444 2.3× 10–5 - 77.8% 6 -
SA net.b 47, 877 4.9× 10–5 - 64.8% 6 -
aEntire sample period. bRecent period.
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Figure 3 Probability that shortest path lengths
(SPLs) are extended by being limited to domestic
linkages in global customer-supplier network
over entire sample period. Circles and squares are
estimation results in United States and Japan. SPL for
unconnected pairs is ∞.
for ﬁrm’s pairs in the same country in a global customer-supplier network and a domestic
customer-supplier network that has only domestic linkages. Figure  shows the probability
that SPLs are extended by being limited to domestic linkages in the United States or Japan.
In the Japanese case of SPL≥  and the U.S. case of SPL≥  in a global customer-supplier
network, the probability is over .. This result suggests that the eﬀect from foreign coun-
tries cannot be ignored, because international relationships are indispensable for handling
incidents in supply chains.
5 Firms’ community structure
Global inter-ﬁrm networks are built by multiple communities. Detecting the communi-
ties in networks means the appearance of dense connected groups of vertices and sparse
connections among groups. Ref. [] conduct community analysis for a global ownership
network, but we do a similar exercise for global customer-supplier network. We adopt
modularity as a quality function of communities introduced by Newman and detect them
by a fast greedy algorithm of modularity maximization that is one eﬀective approach to
identify communities []. If network V is divided into L subsets {V,V, . . . ,VL}which do


























where Alm is an element of adjacent matrix which is set to be  or  according to whether
nodes l and m are connected or not. eii and ai are the fraction of links within subset Vi
and the fraction of links that connect to nodes in subset Vi, respectively.When the subsets
{V,V, . . . ,VL} are selected randomly, eii is canceled out by ai , which gives the expecta-
tion value of the network density for the linkages in subset Vi. Using the modularity we
can compare the actual network density for linkages in a subset with its expectation value.
When the maximized modularity Qmax takes a value close to zero, the network has no
statistically signiﬁcant communities, unlike randomly connected networks. On the other
hand, Qmax   corresponds to a network which is almost perfectly partitioned into mod-
ules.
The maximummodularities of non-directed customer-supplier, non-directed licensor-
licensee, and strategic alliance networks over the entire sample period are ., .,
and ., respectively. Such suﬃciently large modularity means that signiﬁcant commu-
nities exist in the networks. We characterize each community by checking the majority
attributes (e.g., country and industry sector) of the ﬁrms in the community. Because ﬁrm
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Table 3 Top 5 fractions of ﬁrms’ attributes with p-value < 0.01 in major communities in
non-directed licensee-licensor network. R, which expresses ratio between actual fraction and
the fraction obtained by random selection, is deﬁned by Equation (2). Bold font indicates
remarkable attributes with R≥ 3
Rank Country (fraction (>0.01), R) Industry sector (fraction (>0.01), R)
1 United Kingdom (0.067, 1.18) Movies and entertainment (0.105, 3.68)
Japan (0.043, 1.50) Semiconductors (0.083, 4.16)
Taiwan (0.033, 3.34) Broadcasting (0.076, 4.07)
France (0.026, 1.31) Internet software and services (0.061, 1.55)
South Korea (0.020, 1.72) Application software (0.056, 1.19)
2 United States (0.551, 1.13) Internet software and services (0.346, 6.03)
Japan (0.047, 1.65) Application software (0.296, 5.59)
Germany (0.040, 1.44) Asset Management and custody banks (0.073, 2.74)
Switzerland (0.029, 2.50) Health care technology (0.052, 4.36)
France (0.028, 1.37) Healthcare equipment (0.029, 2.34)
3 United States (0.622, 1.27) Apparel, accessories, luxury goods (0.287, 13.59)
Italy (0.046, 3.72) Distributors (0.056, 4.98)
France (0.032, 1.60) Apparel retail (0.051, 7.91)
Thailand (0.010, 1.94) Footwear (0.046, 11.50)
Packaged foods and meats (0.032, 1.55)
4 India (0.046, 1.51) Commodity chemicals (0.128, 9.50)
Japan (0.046, 1.60) Oil and gas reﬁning andmarketing (0.072, 11.90)
Netherlands (0.027, 2.43) Fertilizers, agricultural chemicals (0.050, 13.17)
South Korea (0.025, 2.21) Industrial machinery (0.046, 2.55)
Israel (0.023, 2.23) Construction and engineering (0.044, 5.87)
attribution bias can be found in each network, we compare the fraction of the ﬁrms’ at-
tribution in each community with the fraction in all communities by Ri,l , which is deﬁned
as
Ri,l =
fraction of attribution i in community l in network
fraction of attribution i in all communities in network . ()
The p-values for the fraction of the ﬁrms’ attribution in each community are calculated
using the null hypothesis that the ﬁrms’ attribution is independent of community.
First, we investigate the communities in the licensee-licensor network with the highest
modularity over the entire sample period. The network has , communities. However,
the top four account for over % of all ﬁrms: .%, .%, .%, and .%. Table  shows
the fraction of ﬁrms’ attributions with a p-value < . among the top four communities.
We focus on the remarkable attributions with Ri,l ≥  in each attribution to identify the
community characteristics. The largest community is mainly comprised of movies, en-
tertainment, semiconductors, and broadcasting ﬁrms. Many Taiwan ﬁrms appertain to
this community. The major industry in Taiwan is semiconductors. Therefore, the largest
community expresses sectors for broadcasting technology. As shown in Table , the nd,
rd, and th largest communities show the ICT sectors in health care, the apparel sec-
tors, and the chemical industry sectors, respectively. The licensee-licensor relationships
between major incorporated ﬁrms tend to be conﬁned to similar industrial sectors over
the boundaries between countries.
Wenext focus on over the entire sample period a non-directed strategic alliance network
which has , communities. The top four account for .%, .%, .%, and .% of
all the ﬁrms. In each community, the ﬁrms belong to the similar industrial sectors but
diﬀerent home countries. The largest community mainly includes ﬁrms in ICT sectors
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Table 4 Top 5 fractions of ﬁrms’ attributes with p-value < 0.01 in major communities in
non-directed strategic alliance network. Bold font expresses remarkable attributes with R ≥ 3
Rank Country (fraction, R) Industry sector (fraction, R)
1 United States (0.445, 1.22) Application software (0.150, 2.83)
United Kingdom (0.068, 1.15) Internet software and services (0.127, 2.21)
France (0.036, 1.48) IT consulting and other services (0.088, 3.32)
Taiwan (0.018, 2.25) Communications equipment (0.062, 3.66)
South Korea (0.014, 12.0) Systems software (0.059, 3.79)
2 India (0.072, 2.06) Oil and gas exploration/production (0.097, 3.53)
China (0.071, 1.30) Construction and engineering (0.075, 2.18)
United Kingdom (0.067, 1.13) Aerospace and defense (0.042, 3.56)
Japan (0.066, 1.94) Industrial machinery (0.033, 2.01)
Australia (0.052, 1.56) Electric utilities (0.031, 2.74)
3 China (0.061, 1.12) Diversiﬁed banks (0.105, 7.65)
Japan (0.060, 1.75) Regional banks (0.067, 6.24)
France (0.036, 1.46) Asset management and custody banks (0.064, 2.41)
Indonesia (0.028, 2.79) Airlines (0.056, 8.90)
Hong Kong (0.026, 1.96) Hotel, resorts and cruise lines (0.048, 5.27)
4 United States (0.510, 1.40) Pharmaceuticals (0.205, 9.35)
Germany (0.040, 1.20) Biotechnology (0.192, 10.23)
France (0.029, 1.19) Life sciences tools and services (0.075, 9.11)
Switzerland (0.020, 1.86) Healthcare equipment (0.073, 5.84)
Sweden (0.017, 1.50) Healthcare facilities (0.067, 6.29)
(i.e., IT consulting and other services, communications equipment, system software) as
shown in Table . The nd, rd, and th largest communities express heavy industry, bank
and resort development, and medicine sectors, respectively.
We also investigate ﬁrms’ attribution in each community in a non-directed customer-
supplier network over the entire sample period. The network has , communities. The
top four account for .%, .%, .%, and .% of all the ﬁrms. The nd and rd largest
communities show industry sectors, such as aerospace/defense and health care (Table ).
On the other hand, the th largest community shows transactions in the ASEAN free
trade area because Southeast Asian ﬁrms tend to densely connect to ﬁrms in the same
area. Since various industries are included in the largest community (Table ), we fur-
ther divide the largest one into discrete sub-communities. The major sub-communities
express some industry sectors. The st, nd, and rd largest sub-communities show the
broadcasting technology sectors, department stores (i.e., apparel and restaurant sector),
and the electronic equipment sectors, respectively (Table ).
As cited above, major incorporated ﬁrms tend to have worldwide connections. We in-
vestigate the relationship between ﬁrm size and geographical distance to business partner.
Here, ﬁrm size is measured by the total  revenue. As shown in Figure , the mean of
the geographical distance in a customer-supplier network is about , km, which is
shorter than in other inter-ﬁrm networks (i.e., , km for strategic alliance relation-
ships and , km for licensee-licensor relationships). Because ﬁrms choose suppliers
and customers by taking into consideration transport costs and product price, the mean
of the geographical distance of the customer-supplier network is short. As represented by
the th largest community in the customer-supplier network, a large community that ex-
presses a region is only observed in this network. In inter-ﬁrm networks, the geographical
distance of a large ﬁrm whose annual total revenue exceeds  million dollars tends to be
long; large ﬁrms are aﬀected by the economic conditions in distant unexpected countries.
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Table 5 Top 5 fractions of ﬁrms’ attributes with p-value < 0.01 in major communities in
non-directed customer-supplier networks. Bold font expresses remarkable attributes with
R ≥ 3
Rank Country (fraction, R) Industry sector (fraction, R)
1 United States (0.442, 1.34) Internet software and services (0.081, 2.26)
United Kingdom (0.079, 1.19) Application software (0.058, 1.79)
Japan (0.032, 1.26) Communications equipment (0.032, 2.33)
France (0.026, 1.32) IT consulting and other services (0.030, 1.55)
Taiwan (0.023, 2.27) Regional banks (0.030, 2.18)
2 India (0.103, 2.58) Construction and engineering (0.064, 1.63)
Australia (0.035, 1.24) Aerospace and defense (0.048, 3.82)
Japan (0.033, 1.32) Oil and gas exploration and production (0.041, 2.82)
Germany (0.031, 1.06) Industrial machinery (0.039, 1.73)
France (0.024, 1.19) Electric utilities (0.038, 2.66)
3 United States (0.379, 1.15) Pharmaceuticals (0.086, 5.34)
United Kingdom (0.155, 2.32) Healthcare facilities (0.070, 4.96)
Poland (0.069, 5.52) Healthcare equipment (0.056, 4.71)
Sweden (0.033, 2.96) Biotechnology (0.048, 5.89)
Norway (0.018, 2.49) Healthcare services (0.042, 4.46)
4 Indonesia (0.340, 14.91) Property and casualty insurance (0.114, 14.91)
Thailand (0.090, 7.87) Asset management and custody banks (0.073, 2.46)
Philippines (0.085, 12.26) Life and health insurance (0.058, 9.13)
Singapore (0.028, 2.07) Packaged foods and meats (0.045, 2.21)
Malaysia (0.020, 1.14) Reinsurance (0.044, 22.12)
Table 6 Top 5 fractions of ﬁrm attributes with p-value < 0.01 in major sub-communities in
largest community in customer-supplier network. Bold font expresses remarkable attributes
with R ≥ 3
Rank Country (fraction (>0.01), R) Industry sector (fraction (>0.01), R)
1 United Kingdom (0.078, 1.38) Movies and entertainment (0.135, 4.73)
Israel (0.017, 1.66) Broadcasting (0.128, 6.83)
Internet software and services (0.093, 2.33)
Application software (0.074, 1.59)
Wireless telecommunication services (0.072, 8.88)
2 United States (0.663, 1.36) Apparel, accessories, luxury goods (0.0138, 6.55)
United Kingdom (0.097, 1.70) Packaged foods andmeats (0.077, 3.67)
Apparel retail (0.053, 8.28)
Leisure products (0.039, 3.93)
Restaurants (0.038, 4.53)
3 United States (0.551, 1.13) Semiconductors (0.229, 11.44)
Taiwan (0.084, 8.49) Technology, hardware, storage, peripheral (0.108, 7.94)
Japan (0.077, 2.71) Application software (0.084, 1.80)
South Korea (0.023, 1.99) Communications equipment (0.066, 3.36)
Israel (0.017, 1.70) Systems software (0.066, 4.78)
6 Simulation for conﬂict minerals proliferation
In this section, we conduct a simulation exercise to learn about the implications of the
structure of the global buyer-supplier network, which we studied in the previous sections,
for the proliferation of conﬂict minerals. Our analysis in the previous sections suggest the
following. First, the ﬁnding in Section  (i.e., the link distribution has a power law tail)
suggests that a small number of ﬁrms with an extremely large number of links play an
important role in the proliferation of conﬂict minerals. Second, the ﬁnding in Section 
(i.e., most ﬁrms are connected within six links) suggests that the proliferation of conﬂict
minerals may be surprisingly quick. Third, the ﬁnding in Section  (i.e., ﬁrms within an
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Figure 4 Relationship between ﬁrm size
measured by total 2013 revenue andmean of
geographical distance to business partner.
Circles, squares, and open triangles show
customer-supplier, licensee-licensor, and strategic
alliance relationships in some years over entire
sample period, respectively.
industry – rather than within a country – tends to form a community) suggests that na-
tional borders do not matter for the proliferation of conﬂict minerals. Combined together,
our analysis suggests that it is critically important to identify key ﬁrms located at the very
upstream of the conﬂict mineral supply chain and to regulate transactions associated with
these ﬁrms.
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Note that similar diﬀusion models were employed by previous studies on interﬁrm
customer-supplier networks, includingRef. [] andRef. []. This type of diﬀusionmodel
is simple and tractable butmay be oversimpliﬁed. One of themost important assumptions
adopted in this model is that PageRank of a ﬁrm coincides with the ‘costs of goods sold’
(i.e., the direct costs attributable to the production of the goods sold by a ﬁrm) of that ﬁrm.
To check whether this assumption is supported by the data, we compare PageRank of a
ﬁrm with the costs of goods sold, which is taken from the ﬁnancial statement of the ﬁrm.
The result of this exercise is shown in Figure , in which the horizontal axis represents
PageRank of a ﬁrm and the vertical axis is the costs of goods sold of the ﬁrm. It is clearly
seen that there is a positive and stable relationship between the two variables, indicating
that the assumption adopted in the model is supported by the data.
We explain this general model using an example for conﬂictminerals. gi(t) is the amount
of conﬂict minerals possessed by ﬁrm i at time t, i(t) is the amount of conﬂict minerals
that are extracted by ﬁrm i at time t that doesn’t stem from customer-supplier chains, qi
expresses the rate at which they are consumed as a port of the ﬁnal consumption products
in ﬁrm i, and aij is an element in an input-output matrix. Typical element aij equals /NˆCj
if ﬁrm i is a customer of ﬁrm j and zero otherwise. Here, NˆCj is number of customers of
ﬁrm j. In the standard notation adopted in input-output analysis, aij represents the share
of output j (i.e., commodity produced by ﬁrm j) in the total intermediate output use of
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Figure 5 Relationship between the ‘costs of
goods sold’ of a ﬁrm in 2013 and the PageRank
of the ﬁrm, which is calculated using the
customer-supplier network for the entire sample
period. The probability of a random jump in
calculating PageRank is set at q = 0.05. The plots and
dashed lines represent the mean and the conﬁdence
interval. The reference line shows a power law
relationship with an exponent of 1.05.
ﬁrm i. We have information on whether ﬁrm i purchases something from ﬁrm j, but no
information on the amount of output j purchased by ﬁrm i; this is the thickness of each
customer link. Since we assume that the customer links of ﬁrm j have identical thickness,
aij = /NˆCj if ﬁrm i is a customer of ﬁrm j and zero otherwise. From PageRank theory, it
is trivial that gi(t) converges on gi(t – ) at time t = ∞ when all qi satisfy the inequality,
 < qi ≤ . Note that the solution of this model is given by g = (I –QA)–. However, the
size of the matrix A is very large, making it diﬃcult to obtain its inverse matrix. We solve
numerically using an iterative method, in which gt is calculated period by period.
We simulate the diﬀusion of the conﬂict minerals that are mined in the Democratic Re-
public of the Congo (DRC) and all of its nine neighbors: Angola, Burundi, Central African
Republic, Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia.
We simply assume that i(t) is time independent and set the total  revenue of each
ﬁrm in the ‘metals andmining’ upper-sector (which includes aluminum, diversiﬁedmetals
andmining, gold, preciousmetals andminerals, silver, and steel sectors) in these countries
to i(t). Here, for i(t) for some ﬁrms whose total revenue is not recorded in this dataset,
we substitute the mean of the total revenue of the ﬁrm whose total revenue is recorded
in this upper-sector and these countries. Except for these ﬁrms, i(t) = . All initial values
are gi() = .
We ran the model until gi(t) practically converges on gi(t – ) on the customer-supplier
networkwithout banking sectors over the entire sample period. Figure  shows a simulated
amount of the conﬂict minerals per ﬁrm in each country when all qi = .. The conﬂict
minerals drift down to the ﬁrms even in most developed countries. In the G countries
the top ten industry sectors in which many conﬂict minerals hide products are shown in
Table . Conﬂict minerals are found in the ‘electrical components and equipment’ sector
in G. The ‘metals and mining’ upper-sector and the ‘trading companies and distributors’
sector have only .% of all the ﬁrms in the G and account for .% of the total conﬂict
minerals in G.
We numerically demonstrate the simpliﬁed regulation that all ﬁrms in the ‘metals and
mining’ upper-sector and the ‘trading companies and distributors’ sector in G must not
distribute conﬂict minerals to their customers; the qis of these ﬁrms are one and qi = .
otherwise. As shown in Table , the amount of conﬂict minerals is reduced in each sector.
The conﬂict minerals in the ‘electrical components and equipment’ and ‘alternative car-
riers’ sectors fell by over %, where they substantially improved their conﬂict minerals
issues.
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Figure 6 Simulated amount of conﬂict minerals per ﬁrm outside of DRC and its neighbors.Model’s
parameter is all qi = 0.3 (see Eq. (3)). Maximum amount was normalized to one. Shades of red express
logarithm amount of conﬂict minerals. Firms in Mali and Guinea have many conﬂict minerals. Black expresses
DRC. Gray shows its neighbors.
Table 7 Simulated shares of conﬂict minerals in top 10 industry sectors in G8 and reduction
rate of conﬂict minerals by application of the regulation that all ﬁrms in the ‘metals and
mining’ upper-sector and the ‘trading companies and distributors’ sector in G8must not
distribute conﬂict minerals to their customers; the qis of these ﬁrms are one and qi = 0.3
otherwise in Eq. (3)
Industry sector in G8 Share Reduction rate
Diversiﬁed metals and mining 0.3907 -
Trading companies and distributors 0.2327 -
Gold 0.2251 -
Aluminum 0.0907 -
Commodity chemicals 0.0074 64.9%
Electrical components and equipment 0.0067 97.9%
Alternative carriers 0.0047 99.1%
Silver 0.0039 -
Oil and gas exploration/production 0.0036 5.6%
Diversiﬁed chemicals 0.0027 3.7%
Other sectors 0.0318 43.4%
We numerically show that the amount of conﬂict minerals would decrease eﬀectively
outside the G by a regulation on the purchases of conﬂict minerals directed at % of all
the ﬁrms in G.We selected the % ﬁrms in each of the following conditions and dammed
the conﬂict mineral ﬂow; their qis are one and qi = . otherwise.
Condition  Firms are selected in descending order of the number of supplier links in G.
Condition  Only listed ﬁrms are selected in descending order of the number of supplier
links in G.
Condition  Firms are selected in descending order of the number of supplier links in the
‘metals andmining’ upper-sector and ‘trading companies and distributors’ sectors inG.
Table  shows the numerical simulation results of the regulation with each condition.
In Condition , the selected % ﬁrms decreased distribution of all conﬂict minerals by
.% in G. However, the amount of conﬂict minerals hardly changed in the other ﬁrms.
A U.S. federal law for conﬂict minerals among the listed ﬁrms was passed on July , 
[]. Condition  expresses the situation where this law is applied to all the listed ﬁrms
in G. Although the trend improved slightly from .% to .% in G, the amount of
conﬂict minerals also hardly decreased outside of the selected ﬁrms. On the other hand,
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Table 8 Reduction rate from amount of conﬂict minerals before applying regulation to 3%
ﬁrms in G8 to amount after. Reduction rates in G8 ﬁrms, non-applied G8 ﬁrms, ﬁrms outside
G8, DRC, and DRC’s neighbors are numerically estimated in each condition (see Section 6)
G8 ﬁrms Non-applied
G8 ﬁrms
Firms outside G8, DRC,
and DRC’s neighbors
Condition 1 35.0% 1.3% 3.4%
Condition 2 43.2% 5.8% 4.0%
Condition 3 97.3% 50.5% 12.0%
we conﬁrmed a dramatic reduction in Condition . The selected % of ﬁrms decreased
distribution of all conﬂict minerals by .% in G and created a block that intercepted
about .% of all the conﬂict minerals outside of G, DRC, and DRC’s neighbors.
7 Conclusion
We investigated the structure of global inter-ﬁrm relationships using a unique dataset that
contains the information of business relationships for , major incorporated ﬁrms
and focused on three diﬀerent networks: a customer-supplier network through which
products and services ﬂow; a licensee-licensor network through which technical infor-
mation and know-how ﬂow; and a strategic alliance network through which both ﬂow
mutually.
These networks have common scale-free properties. The degree distributions follow
a power law with an exponent of .. The shortest path length for each pair of ﬁrms is
around six for all three networks. We showed through community structure analysis that
the ﬁrms comprise a community with those ﬁrms that belong to the same industry but
diﬀerent home countries, indicating the globalization of ﬁrms’ production activities.
We measured the mean of the geographical distance between the ﬁrms and their busi-
ness partners. It was , km between business partners for customer-supplier relation-
ships, which is shorter than for the two other relationships. This result suggests that tech-
nical information and know-how without high transport costs have the potential to be
diﬀused rapidly worldwide. We also conﬁrmed that the geographical distance between
business partners for large ﬁrms tends to be long.
Finally, by utilizing a simple diﬀusion model and empirical results where ﬁrms com-
prise a community with those ﬁrms that belong to the same industry but diﬀerent home
countries, we showed numerically that regulations on the purchases conﬂict minerals by
limited number of G ﬁrms belonging to some speciﬁc industries would substantially re-
duce their worldwide use. When these ﬁrms refuse to buy conﬂict minerals from their
suppliers, the supply chains of many intermediaries which are positioned upstream suﬀer.
There remain a couple of issues for our future study. First, we need to collect more
complete data on global interﬁrm linkage and to check the robustness of our results. Sec-
ond, it is important to accurately estimate each intermediary’s amount of damage and the
model’s parameters by comprehensively collecting the data of global inter-ﬁrm relation-
ships. Part of themoneywhichwas spent in ﬁrmsﬂows into conﬂictminerals throughmul-
tiple inter-ﬁrm networks. Third, we need to expand our model by connecting a customer-
supplier network with licensee-licensor and strategic alliance networks. This expanded
model might help make more eﬀective policies for conﬂict minerals. Recently, the global
diﬀusion of weaponry, technical know-how, conﬂict oil, and natural gas through lawful
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trades is also attracting attention. Our results might resolve such issues and contribute to
global peace.
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